Despite Hull City’s incomplete approach play, Norwich City's 2-1 Championship win on Humberside was the latest perfect example of their over-reliance on individual quality against tactically superior opponents.
Ben Lee is a City season ticket holder and author of the NCFC Analysis social media account, who unpicks Canaries' games with an analytical report highlighting tactical strengths and weaknesses.
This is what Ben made of City's spirited victory against a Tigers' side who dominated territory and possession.
Hull versus Norwich: A positive result masking blatant flaws
Score: 1 – 2
Possession (%): 67 – 33
Passes: 695 – 358
Shots: 19 – 9
xG: 0.97 – 1.40
- Hull’s man-to-man press and Norwich’s poor build-up.
- Conceding overloads in every line of pressure.
- Hull’s deficiencies in the final third.
- Is Wagner underachieving?
Base formations
With the feeling the pressure was again building around David Wagner for some among the fan base, this was undoubtedly a significant contest for Norwich’s head coach. Barnes and Giannoulis came back into the Canaries’ side, as Sargent made his full return to create a strong Norwich lineup.
Liam Rosenior handed a debut to new loan signing Carvalho, with both sides setting up in a 4-2-3-1. Sharp replaced Connolly after just 14 minutes, with the latter leaving the field with a suspected concussion.
In Norwich’s deep build-up phases, the visitors transitioned into their typical 4-2-4 structure, with two deep-lying forwards dropping ahead of Sara (17) and Nunez (26).
In what was an aggressive response, Rosenior’s Hull created a complete man-to-man press. The centre-backs jumped into midfield to occupy Norwich’s deep-lying forwards, while the full-backs tracked the wingers.
Despite their positive intent, Hull made a series of early errors in high-pressing phases. With Gunn (28) pausing to bait pressure, Carvalho (45) took the bait and left McLean (23) free to receive and advance.
In a bid to intercept the Norwich captain, Tufan (7) stopped tracking Giannoulis (30), leaving the Greek international free to receive in a 2v1 against Coyle (2). But Norwich failed to capitalise on this early error.
Even with Sharp (12) replacing Connolly (44), the hosts continued to take the bait and press Norwich’s only free man, a pattern Norwich failed to recognise, with Wagner’s side frequently hitting aimless long balls towards the wingers.
In doing so, Norwich targeted the only area in which Hull had a numerical advantage, with Jones (5) dropping back when Gunn (28) went long. It was, therefore, no surprise that Norwich’s build-up play was totally ineffective for most of Friday’s game.
In rare phases of settled possession, Norwich’s usual rotations created a 3-1-3-3 shape. Nunez (26) dropped between the centre-backs as Sainz (7), Rowe (27), and often Sargent (9) occupied space between the lines of Hull’s 4-4-2 mid-block.
Norwich’s full-backs are beginning to advance with more caution at times, while the centre-backs frequently avoid joining the counter-press in defensive transitions, instead tracking back to defend dangerous spaces.
But Norwich’s actual settled-play structure and rest defence remain much the same, while their patterns are persistently basic and predictable. I think we can always expect long diagonals to be the key pattern of Wagner’s side in possession.
Ultimately, this expansive structure continues to risk exposure during defensive transitions. Given their consistent vacation of central spaces, Norwich’s rest defence is only marginally less flawed than it has always been.
Perhaps a more significant factor contributing to the reduction in defensive transition errors is City’s frequent inability to control the ball against the majority of opponents they face.
In Hull’s deep build-up phases, the hosts quickly transitioned into an asymmetric 3-2-4-1 shape. In the first half, Coyle (2) advanced to occupy the right wing, allowing Tufan (7) to invert alongside Carvalho (45), as Jacob (29) became a hybrid left centre-back.
In response, Norwich created a 4-1-3-2 structure before pressing man-to-man on the ball-side. Nunez (26) occupied the deeper midfield role but was often isolated in a 2v1 against Carvalho (45) and Tufan (7) if McLean (23) failed to jump into midfield.
Norwich’s ball-side man-to-man press has, of late, been exposed on the far side. Hull created similar situations using Allsop (17) in the build-up, but they failed to find the right patterns to exploit the weakness effectively.
Between Norwich’s highest pressing phase and their 4-4-2 mid-block, Wagner’s men temporarily created a 4-3-3 shape as Sainz (7) joined the first line to press Jones (5).
This pattern left Coyle (2) free until Giannoulis (30) jumped from the last line. But Hull were able to manipulate Norwich’s press when Morton (15) moved out to the right and Coyle (2) pinned Giannoulis (30) in the last line.
It was in Hull’s settled phases of possession, however, that Norwich’s flaws were most obvious. When Wagner’s men transitioned between a situational, asymmetric 4-3-3 and their more consistent 4-4-2 mid-block, Hull created an overload in every line of pressure.
When Sainz (7) joined Norwich’s forwards to press the situational back three, Hull were able to exploit a recurring weakness in Norwich’s mid-block, as Tufan (7) created an angle to receive behind Sainz (7).
Norwich’s first pressing line was also bypassed when they left Hull’s double pivot free to receive between the lines. In such situations, Sara (17) and Nunez (26) were caught between the Hull pivots and their two number tens.
Once Sara (17) and Nunez (26) decided to jump onto the pivots, they left Carvalho (45) and Tufan (7) free in the half spaces, where further overloads were created by Hull’s 5v4 last-line advantage. On the left, for example, Carvalho (45) and Twine (30) created a 2v1 against Stacey (3).
The host’s last-line overload meant direct passes to Connolly (44), later Sharp (12), gave Duffy (24) a difficult choice. He could either engage the centre-forward, leaving space for Carvalho (45) to exploit, or he could stay back and leave space between the lines.
Opponents continue to exploit these positional and numerical advantages, and Wagner’s failure to adjust in-game isn’t a positive reflection of his tactical nous.
In the second half, Hull’s 3-2-4-1 was created by new rotations. Twine (30) and Tufan (7) switched sides, as Jacob (29) advanced on the left, while Coyle (2) became a hybrid right centre-back.
In high phases out of possession, Wagner’s men created a more passive 4-4-2 press with a midfield diamond. This was an attempt to reduce the space between the lines, but Hull still found positional and numerical advantages.
It is, in my view, unquestionable that Rosenior’s side had tactical superiority over Wagner’s Norwich. The difference was in the two sides’ execution of key moments in the final third; and Hull arguably lacked vertical, ball-carrying profiles in midfield.
Hull frequently rushed final actions, often taking shots from distance rather than completing more dangerous final-third patterns. These missed opportunities to create high-quality chances contributed to the host’s relatively low expected goals figure of 0.97.
Despite Hull’s incomplete approach play, this game was a perfect example of Norwich’s over-reliance on individual quality against tactically superior opponents – a point I seem to make week after week.
Yes, we should question Norwich’s recent recruitment strategy, but the totality of their individual quality is far greater than their collective performances of late; this is indicative of an underperforming head coach.
Just look at Norwich’s starting eleven against Hull. It included six first-team internationals and one England Under-21 international. The remaining four players included Barnes, who played 39 games for last season’s Championship winners; a right-back with Premier League experience in Stacey, an exciting young winger in Sainz, and one of the best players in the division in Sara.
Wagner has created a side that never cease to be tactically outdone by opponents, but they frequently capitalise on mistakes through moments of individual brilliance. People often ask why any of that matters. They say, ‘football is just about putting the ball in the net’.
Nobody has ever questioned that the short-term aim of football is to score goals, and Norwich’s individual quality could still carry them towards the play-off places. But sustainability is only possible with a coach who champions individual development and is capable of out-thinking and out-coaching opposing managers.
At present, neither description applies to Wagner: a head coach who is stifling the development of this club and its individual prospects. Analysis cannot live or die by scorelines – processes matter, and Norwich’s need to improve.
You can read all Ben's previous analysis of Norwich City games via his social media accounts.
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