Norwich City: Tactical analysis of David Wagner's impact

Ben is a City season ticket holder and author of the NCFC Analysis twitter account, which unpicks every Canaries' game with an analytical report highlighting tactical strengths and weaknesses.

With Norwich returning to league action on Saturday against Sheffield United, Ben has taken a look at the tactical transition between former boss Dean Smith and the German.

Before Wagner’s arrival, Smith had tried numerous base formations during his time as Norwich head coach; these included a 4-3-3, a 4-2-3-1 a 4-4-2 diamond and – in Smith’s final game in charge – a 5-4-1 diamond with Josh Sargent just behind Teemu Pukki.

During Smith’s tenure, Norwich were incapable of playing out from the back. The most common first phase build-up structure was a 2-3 shape with wide full backs and one holding midfielder.

There were several problems with this shape. The distances between players were too large and, as a result, they found it difficult to escape the press without going long. Additionally, these large distances impeded Norwich’s ability to counter press when the build-up failed.

There was also a severe disconnect between the players involved in Norwich’s build-up and those further up the pitch.

As a result of Norwich’s poor build-up structure, and a serious lack of movement, they rarely managed to create numerical superiority against the first or second lines of pressure. Together, these issues made playing out from the back almost impossible.

Wagner’s arrival represented a departure from the pragmatism of Smith, and a return to ideology. Wagner immediately implemented clear stylistic changes, one of which was a new build-up structure. While Smith favoured a single pivot behind two number eights, under Wagner Norwich’s build-up typically includes two deep lying midfielders.

In the first two months of Wagner’s tenure, Norwich have predominantly set up with a 2-4 structure in the first build-up phase. In the second phase, this often becomes a 3-1 shape.

The 3-1 structure is created when Kenny McLean drops between or alongside the centre backs to create a back three: a rotation known as ‘La Salida Lavolpiana’. Gabriel Sara remains in midfield as the single pivot. McLean and Sara have played key roles in Wagner’s Norwich side, together they have become the heartbeat of the team in possession.

Numerous top tacticians utilise a 3-1 structure in the second build-up phase, especially against teams with a back five. The 3-1 shape allows the team in possession to maintain numerical superiority in the attacking third against five defenders.

Under Wagner, however, Norwich’s use of this shape against teams with a back four has been problematic. With McLean dropping into a back three, Sara becomes isolated in midfield.

As a result, a midfield void is created. A team set up with a back four will, inevitably, have six players involved in the press. In these circumstances, the central numerical inferiority – created by a 3-1 structure – renders central ball progression nearly impossible.

In Norwich’s victory away at Millwall, Wagner made a minor adjustment to his sides build-up structure through two key rotations.

When McLean dropped into a back three, Sara and Jacob Sorenson both dropped to form a double pivot. Another rotation saw Max Aarons invert into a midfield two from right back.

These rotations created a 3-2 shape in the build-up. By creating a midfield box, this shape improved the connection between each third of the pitch. The 3-2 rest defence made counter pressing much easier in Norwich’s half.

But following the Millwall win, Norwich reverted to a 3-1 structure. This is not necessary when playing a team with a back four, and it leaves Norwich vulnerable during defensive transitions. Instead, against opponents set up with a back four, Wagner should return to a 3-2 build-up structure.

By dropping deep to create a back three, McLean moves into space to receive and distribute the ball. This rotation enhances the connection between the back line and the single pivot, it also allows the team to create numerical superiority and passing angles in the build-up.

For Wagner, this rotation is key to the structure of the team in possession; it allows the full backs freedom to advance into the wide zones, which means the wingers can invert into the half spaces. This leads to the occupation of each of the five vertical corridors.

Positional play, whereby the pitch is divided into zones and corridors, is a significant tactical concept in football. Movement, positional interchanges, and rotations occur between these zones.

At its most extreme, positional play – a Spanish concept also known as juego de posicion – is used as a rigid structure which determines where players should be positioned on the pitch.

For example, managers such as Pep Guardiola and Luis Enrique encourage there to be no more than three players on the same horizontal line, and no more than two players on the same vertical line at the same time.

This optimises passing angles all over the pitch and makes the pitch as big as possible for the opposing side to defend.

While Wagner does not take positional play this literally, he uses it as a framework for his sides attacking structure.

Each of the five vertical corridors need to be occupied. Typically, the wide zones are filled by the full backs, inverted wingers occupy the half spaces, and a striker is positioned in the central corridor.

This creates a 5v4 overload against a back four. Rotations can occur between these corridors but, ideally, each of the corridors will remain occupied.

Just behind this attacking five lies a second striker (often Sargent) or a number ten (recently Marcelino Nunez). By creating a 5v4 in attack, space is often created in front of the opponents back line. It is the second striker or number ten who occupies this space. In the final third, this space moves into ‘zone 14’.

When the pitch is divided into eighteen zones, the fourteenth zone represents the central space and half spaces on the edge of the box.

More importantly, this zone often lies between the opponents defensive and midfield lines. With a creative midfielder or second striker occupying this space, ‘zone 14’ becomes a key location for chance creation and conversion.

With a front five forcing the back line towards their own goal, opponents are vulnerable to conceding from cutbacks to a free player in ‘zone 14’. This became a common occurrence following Wagner’s appointment.

Another key concept within Wagner’s philosophy is the 'gegenpress', or counter press in English.

The gegenpress involves pressing at the moment of defensive transition, when the opponent is trying to regain control of the ball and identify passing options; this is when they are most vulnerable.

For Wagner, the gegenpress is a key method of chance creation. This is best explained by Wagner’s compatriot and close friend Jürgen Klopp, “you win the ball high on the pitch and you’re close to the (opponents) goal…only one pass away from a good opportunity”. Klopp concluded, “no playmaker in the world can be as good as a good counter pressing situation.”

By occupying each of the five vertical corridors, Wagner’s side create numerical superiority in the attacking third; this makes it easy to counter press high up the pitch, to win possession “only one pass away from a good (goalscoring) opportunity.”

This is something Norwich could get better at; but since Wagner’s arrival, there have been clear signs of improvement.

Since his arrival, many of Wagner’s players have benefitted from the clarity with which he goes about his work. Within a clear philosophy, there are clear individual roles.

According to Ralf Rangnick, an influential figure in the initial stages of Wagner’s coaching career, the job of a head coach is “to have a clear idea of how their team should play” and “to transform this idea of football into the heads, hearts, brains, veins of their players”.

Aside from the setup against Stoke, there is no doubt that Wagner has done exactly that.

The next challenge for this Norwich side is to be consistent in their performances and tactically adaptable but, for now at least, Wagner’s impact has been clear.

You can read all Ben's previous analysis of Norwich City games via his social media accounts.

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